TOWARDS A MORE POLITICAL EUROPE ?

TOWARDS A MORE POLITICAL EUROPE ?

Ignace Berten op
Espaces – Brussels

Three recent events raise very new questions from a political point of view for the European Union : the energy crisis and the question of supply, the world financial and economic crisis and the recent war in South Ossetia and Georgia. In addition, the Environment and Climate Change have also taken on a clear political dimension in the last few years. Here, we will try to pin-point in what way and to which extent these events raise anew the question of a political Europe.

1. Two founding Treaties, two decision-making procedures

The European Union is the present culmination of a process started with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. The content of the CECA Treaty was purely economic, the longer-term objective being nevertheless fundamentally political : not only establishing lasting peace but also the construction of a Federal Europe. The Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community in 1957, presents the economic aspect by having the longer-term objective of a single market for all the member countries of the Community, but leaves aside the political aspect. Limited political elements were re-introduced when the European Union was created by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 : the laying down of the basic foundations for an Interior Policy (JHA, Justice and Home Affairs in the area of Justice, the Police, border management etc.) and a Common Foreign Policy (CFSP : Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP : Common Security and Defense Policy). The Lisbon Treaty, if it is finally ratified, which is probable, extends the possibilities for co-operation in these two areas.

However, these two policy areas fall within another institutional dynamic to the area of economics. The JHA and CFSP/CSDP are not Community competences but fall rather under the intergovernmental. Where is the difference ? From the decisional point of view, the Community Pillar is generally treated through qualified majority (more or less two-thirds of the Member States and two-thirds of the population), - it is like this for all the economy sector, with the social and fiscal, nevertheless, still requiring unanimity or ad-hoc co-operation, - and in the majority of cases it requires a co-decision procedure involving the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. In addition in this area, the European Commission has the monopoly for legislative initiative and the mission of supervising the application of Directives and Regulations, the European Court of Justice deciding in the last instance. However, for the two other Pillars, JHA and CFSP/CSDP which fall under Intergovernmental competences, decisions are taken by Heads of State and Government and they necessarily assume unanimous decisions (difficult between 27) ; the Commission cannot intervene (unless the Governments entrust it with a specific mission), the Parliament has no power (it can only, and at its own initiative, express opinions, but it is not formally consulted).

The Lisbon Treaty amends the two Treaties while maintaining the distinction between Community procedures and Intergovernmental procedures.

2. Energy Supply

Our Industrial Economy and organization of everyday life are very dependant on energy, particularly energy from fossil fuels : oil and gas and to a lesser extent coal. In the last few years, it has become clear that sources of oil and gas are limited and that alternatives will have to be found. For electricity, nuclear power has new attractions but the oldest power stations are not completely safe and major accidents are still possible ; in addition, nuclear waste, whose radioactivity is a serious threat, can still not be treated and discarded in a sustainable way. Without excluding new generation nuclear, European policies strive to develop production technologies and processes which consume less energy and create and apply alternative technologies (solar, wind etc.).

Alternative technologies will not allow us, however, to quickly do without, or indeed totally, fossil fuels. But Europe is almost 100% dependant on third countries for its supply of both oil and gas. Significant disruption of supply could have very serious both political and economic consequences. More than a quarter of the gas used in Europe comes from Russia and almost this entire supply transits through Ukraine via the Droujba (friendship) pipeline. Relations between Russia and Ukraine are very strained : Russia feels threatened by the eventual integration of Ukraine into the European Union and above all into NATO : it is practically surrounded to the West and South by the enlargement of NATO and the increase of American bases. In January 2006, Russia cut off oil and then gas supplies at the Ukrainian border. The crisis only lasted a few days. In January 2007, it was oil which stopped flowing at the Bielorussian border and then at the border with Ukraine. This time again, an agreement was reached within a few days. On January 1st 2009, Russia once again closed the gas pipelines : eighteen European countries were affected, the countries of South Eastern Europe being completely cut off even if there was no immediate alternative. Officially, the dispute with Ukraine is about pricing, but it is above all political. Moscow wanted to provoke a row between Ukraine and the European Union and to split Europeans by playing on the fact that the states of Western Europe depended much less on Russia than those of Central Europe. It took three weeks to find a solution, at least provisionally.

Europe’s general external dependence for its gas and oil supply and its dependency on Russia in an atmosphere of recurring tensions moves European states to act together more politically and provide themselves with the means of common action. But political will and spirit of solidarity are only very weakly manifested.

3. The Financial and Economic crisis.

The collapse of some of the most reputed financial institutions, first in the United States, then in Europe, in 2007 following the sub-prime crisis, spilled over by bringing down the real economy as of the 2nd semester of 2008. A major recession started with all of the resulting social consequences : massive job losses (more than 2mio jobs lost in the United States in 2008) lead to exploding unemployment and the indebtedness of numerous families unable to re-reimburse their loans drove them into poverty.

This major crisis has shaken the dogma of neo-liberalism : auto-regulation of the market is an illusion, the risk-assessment systems are blind, individual professional operators can commit billions of dollars or euros on wind and no-one is controlling or caring. The State was considered a disturbance, preventing the market from functioning in a rational way. Those who had been ringing alarm bells for years saying the system would abruptly collapse, were not taken seriously. Then, all at once, in the crisis the State is turned to for help : only it can save the economy, contrary to everything that has been said since Reagan and Thatcher. The state is called on to re-finance, even nationalize, the largest financial companies threatened with bankruptcy. The consequences for the economy and the population of the bankruptcy of the largest banks would be dramatic : the productive economy paralyzed, bankruptcy of companies one after the other, tens of millions of families in poverty with all the risks of political destabilization that this could lead to.

At European level, it seems clear that it is not possible to let each government find solutions for itself : co-ordination is necessary. Here again, the question of the European policy-maker arises. But even if the question arises, the present answer is still not clear. There is certainly shared reflection but co-ordination remains at a minimum level. The crisis should be tackled by establishing real economic governance capable of taking the financial, industrial, commercial, fiscal and social dimensions into account so as to put in place the instruments of a common economic policy. This is still far away but at least the question has arisen at this stage.

4. The War in South Ossetia and Georgia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of its constituent states regained their autonomy. Such was the case for Georgia in 1991. Nevertheless, two regions proclaimed their independence : Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was not recognized internationally but was supported by Russia, and in fact the central power lost its control. On August 7th 2008, very unwisely, the President Saakachvili started a military operation to regain the control of South Ossetia. Very quickly, Russia intervened militarily also, invaded the territory routing the Georgian army while at the same time occupying part of Georgian territory beyond Ossetia.

Politically, this is a major development from a geopolitical and strategic point of view. It is known that Russia has no hesitation in using force to maintain order on its territory when confronted with moves towards autonomy : the brutality of the war in Chechnya is an example. But that was within its own borders : thus an Interior affair. In South Ossetia, this is the first Russian military intervention outside its borders since 1990. Given the close relations between Georgia and the United States, - Georgia occupying a strategic position because of the transit of two pipelines from the Caspian, the only connection passing outside Russian territory, - it is also the first time that the prospect of a major conflict between Russia and NATO became real again since the end of the Cold War.

The French Presidency of the European Union was very committed to preventing the conflict from degenerating and to finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Russian troops withdrew, the statue of South Ossetia within the Georgian State was to be renegotiated. It is unlikely that Georgia regains control in reality as South Ossetia became a sort of Russian protectorate… Here again, developments forced the Union to take more responsibility as a real political actor.

As a consequence of the fall of the USSR and the dismantling of its territory, there ensued a long period of political instability in Russia. In the international arena, Russia appeared as weak and unassertive. The Presidency of Mr. Poutine marked a decisive turning point : reestablishing internal order and restoring Russian national pride. Russia became, once again, a major player in world affairs.

The consequences of this for the European Union are very important. For both energy and political-military reasons, it is forced to position itself with respect to Russia. As it is geographic neighbour, this presents itself in an entirely different way than for the United States. The challenge for Europe is to find a mode of positive relations with Russia and a real form of partnership capable of reinforcing peace on the continent, to contribute to political stability and to ensure economic development for all. From this standpoint , the interests of NATO, dominated by the United States, and those of Europe are not entirely convergent : American policy, seeking to militarily surround Russia by multiplying its bases and systematically enlarging NATO (pressure to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the organization), is contrary to Europe’s search to establish positive relations with Russia.

The war in Georgia, therefore, clearly poses the question to the European Union as to how it wishes and how it can assume its independent, political responsibilities as a Union

Conclusion

Recent events are pushing the European Union into its political dimensions. The way in which this situation came about presents positive aspects, which can progress the European project, but also presents some doubts.

The European project is political by its origin but the political dimension remained in the background for a long time to the advantage of the economic project alone. A political aspect was reintroduced by the Maastricht Treaty and events have pushed towards political intervention. This is a positive gain. But a question remains, a challenge and an ambiguity also.

First, the question : will the Union succeed really in assuming its political responsibilities at the present time and act as a coherent and independent player ? The differences in options and sensitivities of the twenty-seven States present a major difficulty for the question : are Transatlantic relations a priority, political autonomy or not within NATO, etc.(no-one contests the necessity of a partnership with the United states but does this mean alignment or not ?), very contrasted historical experiences in relations with Russia. Will our States collectively be able to rise to the global societal questions raised by the events of these last years ?

The challenge : Russia has once again become a true European and geopolitical power. Will the Union be capable of defining a common policy of coexistence and partnership that can be mutually beneficial, contributing equally to peace and political stability as well as economic development ? In addition, will it be able to do it without sacrificing the complex questions of democracy and Human Rights in Russia to the obvious economic interests ?

The ambiguity : the last months have clearly brought the European Union to taking common political initiatives. However, the question has to be raised as to the shape of this political dimension. From the outset, the European project was a community project. Seen from this perspective, the Lisbon Treaty is a step backwards compared to the Draft Constitution Treaty. A stable Union Presidency is maintained (two and a half years, renewable once, to replace the rotating six-monthly Presidency). However, the person who was to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs is only the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs : this change of title is the expression of a wish to reduce the political dimension of this post. For the same reason, the political symbols have been abandoned from the Treaty : the flag, the anthem and the currency. Even if there have been important developments recently with respect to political initiative, they have accentuated the intergovernmental nature of the Union to the detriment of its Community dimension. In the three recent burning issues, all were dealt with by the Heads of State and Government, neither the Commission representing the Community interest nor the Parliament representing the citizens, were involved. Thus the question : the Community dimension which is already weakened, will it not be even more so ? In other words : will diverging or rather competing national interests be more and more the subject of the negotiation and compromise, the search for the common good, common objectives for the well-being of all ?